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I. INTRODUCTIONTHE Second Amendment states that "[a] well regulated Militia, be-
ing necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."' Until recently,
the text of the Second Amendment has been subject to little judicial in-
terpretation.2 However, after the Supreme Court decided Heller3 and
McDonald,4 lower courts have been presented with questions concerning
the scope of the Second Amendment by litigants across the country, and
there is no turning back.5 Most notably, Heller failed to specify the level
of scrutiny that lower courts should apply to claimed Second Amendment
violations. 6 Indeed, in oral arguments for Heller, Chief Justice Roberts
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. The Court intentionally left open many questions on the Second Amendment's
application in Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) "since this case [is] this
Court's first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to
clarify the entire field."
3. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (The Supreme Court decided that that the Second Amend-
ment guarantees an individual's right to possess firearms, but did not come close in "clar-
ify[ing] the entire field.").
4. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
5. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing the scope of
the Second Amendment as a "vast terra incognita").
6. See generally Andrew Peace, Comment, A Snowball's Chance in Heller: Why De-
castro's Substantial Burden Standard is Unlikely to Survive, 54 B.C. L. REV. E. Supp. 175,
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was particularly sensitive to a litigant's request of the Court to articulate
a standard of review for Second Amendment challenges, "I don't know
why when we are starting afresh, we would try to articulate a whole stan-
dard that would apply in every case?"7
With respect to the meaning of the Second Amendment, commentators
hold two very distinct and different views. 8 One side believes that the
Second Amendment grants and protects only a collective right to bear
arms in a military context,9 while the opposing group believes that the
Second Amendment grants and protects an individual's right to possess
firearms.10 However, that is not the only hotly contested debate sur-
rounding the Second Amendment. With the sad and unfortunate news of
school shootings and shootings in populated public areas across the coun-
try exacerbating contentious political debate on state and local govern-
mental gun control laws," the Supreme Court must further tailor the
scope of the Second Amendment given that lower courts are floundering
in their attempt to interpret the Court's holding in Heller. Indeed, there
are as many judicial interpretations to Second Amendment applications
as there are local variations in contemporary handgun carry laws.12 For
instance, state laws differ in whether a permit is required to carry a defen-
sive handgun outside the home; 13 whether a permit is available on a shall-
issue basis to all citizens not within a limited set of specific exclusions, or
is instead vested in the discretion of state or local officials;14 which places
180-82 (2013); Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer's Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 703, 704, 737 (2012).
7. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290).
8. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (2008).
9. "The 'collective rights' view asserts that the Amendment secures to states the right
to continue to organize and maintain an armed militia of citizens, which could be mobilized
into a military force for the defense of the nation in time of need." CALVIN MASSEY,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 1313 (Vicki Been et al. eds.,
4th ed. 2013).
10. "The 'individual rights' view asserts that the Amendment ensures an individual's
right to possess firearms for any number of reasons." Id.
11. Eric Tucker, Police say 3 dead after shooting at Maryland mall, YAHOO! NEWS
(Jan. 25, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/police-3-dead-shooting-maryland-mall-174420449
.html; Christopher Spencer, Purdue University Shooting Reopens Gun Control Debate, LIB-
ERTY VOICE (Jan. 21, 2014), http://guardianlv.com/2014/01/purdue-university-shooting-re
opens-gun-control-debate/ (detailing the many tragic shootings that have occurred since
2011 and the focus politicians have shown towards these tragedies).
12. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 440-41 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting)
(noting that in 2013, thirty-one states allowed open carry of a handgun without a permit,
twelve states allowed open with a permit, seven states disallowed open carrying of a fire-
arm, and forty-four states allow concealed carry of a handgun with a permit, while a re-
maining four allowed it without permit).
13. Compare ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102, 13-3112 (2011) (allowing open or con-
cealed carry of handguns without a permit, but also making available an optional permit),
with MINN. STAT, § 624.714 (2011) (requiring a state-issued permit to lawfully carry a gun).
Michael P. O'Shea, Modeling The Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial
Tradition and the Scope of "Bearing Arms" for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585,
592-93 [hereinafter "O'Shea"].
14. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425b(7) (2009) (stating that county con-
cealed weapons licensing boards "shall issue" a carry permit to all applicants who meet
stated requirements), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121, 131 (2007) (granting local
2014] 403
SMU LAW REVIEW
are off-limits for legal handgun carry;' 5 and the foundational question of
whether carrying weapons in public is legal at all.16
This comment will offer a background of Second Amendment jurispru-
dence, detail a few recent cases concerning the right to carry a weapon
outside the home, and present a critical analysis of Second Amendment
protection via those cases, ultimately concluding that the Second Amend-
ment extends outside the home and includes carrying a firearm in the
public domain.' 7 While this conclusion will conflict with the numerous
federal courts that have held that the Second Amendment is limited to
the home,18 holdings that are not shocking given the political maelstrom
regarding gun control in the United States,19 I will show that the "consti-
tutional right of armed self-defense is broader than the right to only keep
and bear a firearm in one's home" 20 because, while the need for self-
defense is "most acute" 21 in the home, the need for self-defense is also
acute in public.
II. SUPREME COURT CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. THE FIRST SHoT: DIsTRIcT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER
A District of Columbia law criminalized carrying unregistered firearms
and prohibited the registration of handguns. 22 Dick Heller, a special of-
ficer for the District of Columbia who was authorized to carry a handgun
officials broad discretion to issue permits only to individuals they deem "suitable"). See
O'Shea supra note 13.
15. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7cl0(a)(16) (West 2011) (prohibiting carry in
places of worship) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.3 (2009) (prohibiting permit holders from
carrying firearms in any establishment where alcoholic beverages are sold and consumed),
with OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1272.1, 1277 (2011) (designating neither restaurants nor
churches as a prohibited place for permit holders, though elementary schools and bars are
prohibited). See O'Shea supra note 13.
16. See O'Shea, supra note 13.
17. "[t]he leap from Heller to a right to carry is modest: accounts of the broad and
longstanding acceptance of open carry from common law through ratification and incorpo-
ration dot both Heller and McDonald like white stones on a forest floor." James Bishop,
Hidden or on the Hip: The Right(s) to Carry After Heller, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 921-22
(2012).
18. Federal and state court opinions holding that the Second Amendment does not
confer a right that extends beyond the home. See aff'd sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012); Moore v. Madigan, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1102
(C.D. Ill. 2012), rev'd, Moore, 702 F.3d 933; Moreno v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, No. 10-cv-
6269, 2011 WL 2748652, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2011); Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp.
2d 235, 264-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Gonzalez v. Vill. of W. Milwaukee, No. 09CV0384, 2010
WL 1904977, at *4 (E.D. Wis. May 11, 2010), aff'd in part, vacated as moot in part, 671
F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2012); Commonwealth v. Perez, 952 N.E.2d 441, 451 (Mass. App. Ct.
2011); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1169, 1177 (Md. 2011); Little v. United States, 989
A.2d 1096, 1101 (D.C. 2010).
19. United States v. Maciondaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring).
20. Moore, 702 F.3d at 935.
21. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
22. Id. at 574-75.
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at the Thurgood Marshall Judiciary Building, challenged the law.2 3 He
wished to keep a handgun at home, but the District of Columbia (herein-
after "the District") refused his application for a registration certificate. 24
As a result, Heller subsequently filed a lawsuit against the District, argu-
ing that its laws prohibiting the carrying of a firearm in the home without
a license, among other things, violated the Second Amendment. 25
First, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by Jus-
tice Scalia, divided the Second Amendment, as would a grammar teacher,
into its prefatory clause ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State") and its operative clause ("the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms").26 Justice Scalia noted that "a prefatory clause
does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause," and that the
Court's opinion "will return to the prefatory clause to ensure that our
reading of the operative clause is consistent with the announced pur-
pose." 27 He then parsed the Second Amendment into its main clauses in
order to define the meaning of each clause, as reflected in subparts a, b,
and c of this subheading.28
1. The Operative Clause
a. "Right of the People"
Justice Scalia stated that the first pivotal feature of the operative clause
of the Second Amendment is that it codifies a "right of the people." 29
The Court, engaging in an intertextual interpretation, stated that the
phrase "right of the people" appears in the Constitution and Bill of
Rights, in the First Amendment's Assembly and Petition Clause, in the
Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause, and in the Ninth
Amendment.30 The Court noted that "[a]ll three of these instances unam-
biguously refer to individual rights, not 'collective' rights, or rights that
may be exercised only through participation in some corporate body."3'
Notably, there are other areas of the Constitution that used the phrase
"the people" with no reference to "rights," such as Section 2 of Article I
and the Tenth Amendment.32 Moreover, because "those provisions ar-
guably refer to 'the people' acting collectively ... they deal with the exer-
cise or reservation of powers, not rights." Indeed, "nowhere else in the
Constitution does a 'right' attributed to 'the people' refer to anything
other than an individual right."33 Expounding on this argument, the
Court stated that "in all six other provisions of the Constitution that men-
23. Id. at 575.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 575-76.
26. Id. at 577.
27. Id. at 578.
28. Id. at 579-99.




33. Id. at 579-80.
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tion 'the people,' the term unambiguously refers to all members of the
political community, not an unspecified subset." 34 As a result, there is a
vast difference with "the militia" in the prefatory clause because "the mi-
litia" in colonial America consisted of a subset of "the people"-male,
able-bodied, and bound within a certain age group. 35
b. "Keep and Bear Arms"
In this section of the opinion, the Court began with the object
("Arms") of the two verbs in the clause ("keep and bear").36 To deter-
mine the usage of the term "Arms" at the time of the passage of the
Second Amendment, the Court used different editions of dictionaries
that would shed light on the meaning the Framers intended when they
used "Arms."37 It set out the various definitions that applied, stating that
the term "Arms" has been applied consistently over history as "weapons
that were not specifically designed for military use and were not em-
ployed in a military capacity."38 This finding allowed it to quickly and
summarily rebut the "frivolous" argument that "only those arms in exis-
tence in the eighteenth century are protected by the Second Amend-
ment." 39 In quickly disposing of this disingenuous argument made by
some on the "collective right" side of the debate, it stated that just as the
First Amendment protects modern forms of communications (such as
computer transmissions and telephone calls), and the Fourth Amendment
applies to modern forms of search (such as using enhanced thermal tech-
nology as a substitute to a physical invasion), the Second Amendment
extends to all objects that constitute bearable arms, even those not in
existence at the time the Second Amendment was passed.40
Much like the previous section of the opinion, the grammar and dic-
tionary lesson of an English class continued as the Court turned its atten-
tion to defining the clauses "keep arms" and "bear arms," utilizing the
previously referenced dictionaries to determine their meanings. 41
Johnson defined "keep" as, most relevantly, "[t]o retain; not to lose,"
and "[t]o have in custody." Webster defined it as "[t]o hold; to retain
in one's power or possession." No party has apprised us of an idio-
matic meaning of "keep Arms." Thus, the most natural reading of
"keep Arms" in the Second Amendment is to "have weapons." The
34. Id. at 580.
35. Id. at 580-81.
36. Id. at 581.
37. Id. (Justice Scalia used the 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's dictionary, the 1771
edition of Timothy Cunningham's legal dictionary, and Webster's early nineteenth Century
American Dictionary of the English Language). Justice Scalia is known for his citations to
a wide array of dictionaries from history, and one can imagine that the shelves of his li-
brary are filled with dictionaries from different time periods.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 582. Indeed, even Sanford Levinson, a noted liberal, has stated that it is a
disingenuous argument that "Arms" is limited to muskets. See generally Sanford Levinson,
The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 654-55 (1989).
40. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582.
41. Id.
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phrase "keep arms" was not prevalent in the written documents of
the founding period that we have found, but there are a few exam-
ples, all of which favor viewing the right to 'keep Arms' as an indi-
vidual right unconnected with militia service. William Blackstone, for
example, wrote that Catholics convicted of not attending service in
the Church of England suffered certain penalties, one of which was
that they were not permitted to "keep arms in their houses." 4 2
The Court continued its citation to historical dictionaries in stating that,
at the time of the founding of the Constitution, as well as in contempo-
rary usage to "bear" has meant to "carry." 4 3 Moreover, the Court supple-
mented its historical sources with an excerpt from a present day opinion,
citing a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg.44 Furthermore, while the
phrase implies that the carrying of a weapon is for the purpose of "offen-
sive or defensive action," it in no way connotes participation in a struc-
tured military organization. 45 The Court then concluded, based on its
review of founding-era sources, that to "bear arms" was unambiguously
used to refer to the carrying of weapons outside of an organized militia.46
c. Meaning of the Operative Clause
The Court then combined its previous analysis of the textual elements
of the Second Amendment to find that the Amendment "guarantee[s] the
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,"
stating that like the First and Fourth Amendments, the Second Amend-
ment codified a pre-existing right.47 To support this assertion, it transi-
tioned from a grammar lesson to a history lesson, relying on English
history much more so than American history.48 It was this English history
that informed the drafters of the Second Amendment, as it had long been
understood to be that English right, which was clearly an individual right,
that was the predecessor to the Second Amendment. 49 Indeed, Black-
stone, whose work is credited as "the preeminent authority on English
law," cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the En-
42. Id.
43. Id. at 584.
44. Id. (In analyzing the meaning of "carries a firearm" in a federal criminal statute,
Justice Ginsburg wrote that "a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution's Second
Amendment . . . indicate[s]: 'wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or
in a pocket, for the purpose ... of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action
in a case of conflict with another person."' Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143
(J. Ginsburg, dissenting opinion) (quoting BLACK's LAw DIcTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1998)).
45. Heller, 554 U.S. at 584.
46. Id. at 584. (Citing prominent examples of nine state constitutional provisions writ-
ten in the eighteenth century and the first two decades of the nineteenth century, which
spoke of a right of citizens to "bear arms in defense of themselves and the state.").
47. Id. at 592.
48. Id. at 592-95. Justice Scalia detailed the suppression of political dissidents by the
Stuart Kings between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, which caused the En-
glish to seek and obtain assurance from William and Mary that the Protestants would not
be disarmed and would have a right to keep arms for defensive purposes. Id.
49. Id. at 593.
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glishmens' fundamental rights.50 Furthermore, Blackstone said of the
right to possess arms, it is the "natural right of resistance and self-preser-
vation," and "the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and
defence."51
In concluding the discussion of the Operative Clause of the Second
Amendment, and moving to the Prefatory Clause, the Court stated that
There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history,
that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep
and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First
Amendment's right of free speech was not. Thus, we do not read the
Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for
any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amend-
ment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.52
2. Prefatory Clause
a. "Well Regulated Militia"
As a reminder, the Prefatory Clause of the Second Amendment states
that "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State . . . . 3 Furthermore, in defining this clause, it is paramount to be
mindful of a principle set forth by the Court in an opinion three-quarters
of a century ago consistent with the definition of the clause at the time of
the founding, namely that "the Militia comprised all males physically ca-
pable of acting in concert for the common defense." 54 Therefore, follow-
ing stare decisis, the adjective describing the "Militia," "well regulated,"
means only that the "Militia" is subject to proper discipline and
training.55
b. "Security of a Free State"
The Court again engaged in an intertextual Constitutional analysis by
stating that "security of a free state" meant the security of the free coun-
try, despite the fact that the term "State" refers to individual states in
other parts of the Constitution.56 The Court reasoned that the phrase "se-
curity of a free state" was used as a term of art in 18th century political
discussions, and that it most closely meant a free polity.57 The argument
that the "security of a free state" did not refer to the security of each of
the several states is buttressed by the fact that "the other instances of
'state' in the Constitution are typically accompanied by modifiers making
50. Id. at 593-94.
51. Id. at 594.
52. Id. at 595 (internal citations omitted).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
54. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).




Bearing the Burden of Denial
clear that the reference is to the several States58 . . . [and] the term 'for-
eign state' in Article I and Article III shows that the word 'state' did not
have a single constitutional meaning." 59
3. Connection Between Prefatory and Operative Clauses
Having methodically interpreted the definition of the Prefatory Clause
and the Operative Clause in an exhaustive manner, the Court was finally
prepared to decide whether the Second Amendment created an individ-
ual right to bear arms.60 Referring to 18th century English history, the
Court stated:
once one knows the history that the founding generation knew and
that we have described above. That history showed that the way ty-
rants had eliminated a militia consisting of all the able-bodied men
was not by banning the militia but simply by taking away the peo-
ple's arms, enabling a select militia or standing army to suppress po-
litical opponents. This is what had occurred in England that
prompted codification of the right to have arms in the English Bill of
Rights.61
The Court then discussed the manner in which English history formed the
intention of the framers of the Bill of Rights and the purpose of the right
to bear arms.
The debate with respect to the right to keep and bear arms, as with
other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, was not over whether it was
desirable (all agreed that it was) but over whether it needed to be
codified in the Constitution. During the 1788 ratification debates, the
fear that the federal government would disarm the people in order to
impose rule through a standing army or select militia was pervasive
in Antifederalist rhetoric. Federalists responded that .. . such a force
could never oppress the people. It was understood across the politi-
cal spectrum that the right helped to secure the ideal of a citizen
militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive military
force if the constitutional order broke down. It is therefore entirely
sensible that the Second Amendment's prefatory clause announces
the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination
of the militia.62
Finally, the Court buttressed its conclusion by noting the following: (1)
state adoption of Second Amendment analogues was a strong indicator of
Congressional thought during the framing of the Bill of Rights;63 (2) legal
scholars at the time of the founding understood the Second Amendment
to protect an individual right independent of the militia;64 (3) 19th cen-
58. "Each state," "several states," "any state," "that state," "particular states," "one
state," "no state." Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 598.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 598-99.
63. Id. at 601-03.
64. Id. at 605.
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tury cases interpreting the Second Amendment unanimously supported
an individual right to bear arms apart from the militia;65 (4) during Post-
Civil War Reconstruction, it was plainly the understanding of Congress
that the right of free African-Americans to bear arms, just like any other
free man, was "one of three 'indispensable' 'safeguards of liberty . . .
under the Constitution, a man's 'right to bear arms for the defense of
himself and family and his homestead;" 66 (5) every late 19th century le-
gal scholar has interpreted the Second Amendment to secure an individ-
ual right unconnected with militia service;67 and (6) that the Court's
previous holding in United States v. Miller68 is consistent with and posi-
tively suggests that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to
keep and bear arms and that the Miller court says only that the "Second
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled
shotguns. "69
Similar to most constitutionally protected rights, the right to bear arms
guaranteed by the Second Amendment is limited.70 Indeed, the Court
stated that the Second Amendment is limited to the sorts of weapons in
common use at the time of the founding, supporting the prohibition on
the carrying of "dangerous and unusual weapons," such as M-16 rifles
and similar weapons.71 Gun rights activists argued that weapons used in
the military, such as the M-16, should be protected under the Second
Amendment because these weapons would be used in a modern day mili-
tia.7 2 However, the Court dismissed this argument by stating that "the
fact that modern developments may have limited the degree of fit be-
tween the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our in-
terpretation of the right." 73
4. Application of the Second Amendment to the Ban and Heller's
Conclusion
The Court summarized the D.C. law succinctly as a law that "totally
bans handgun possession in the home [and] requires that any lawful fire-
arm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all times,
rendering it inoperable." 74 The Court then noted that the right to defend
one's self is central to the Second Amendment and, therefore, the hand-
65. Id. at 610.
66. Id. at 616 (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1182 (1866)).
67. Id.
68. 307 U.S. 174 (1939)
69. Heller, 554 U.S. at 614-626.
70. Id. at 626. The Court set place many examples of limitations on the Second
Amendment for those interested, namely "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensi-
tive places such as school and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qual-
ifications on the commercial'sale of arms." Id.
71. Id. at 627.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 627-28.
74. Id. at 628.
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gun ban amounted to a prohibition of an entire class of "arms" that
Americans have chosen for the lawful purpose of self-defense, especially
the highly critical right in defending one's self, family, and property.75
The Court then went a step further when speaking about the handgun
ban and stated that
It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban
the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other fire-
arms (i.e., long guns) is allowed. It is enough to note, as we have
observed, that the American people have considered the handgun to
be the quintessential self-defense weapon. There are many reasons
that a citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier to
store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it can-
not easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier
to use for those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a
long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other
hand dials the police. Whatever the reason, handguns are the most
popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home,
and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.76
In conclusion, the Court stated that the District's ban on handgun pos-
session in the home and its prohibition against rendering a lawful firearm
in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense violated
the Second Amendment.77 However, the Court intentionally left open
many Second Amendment questions stating that "since this case [is] this
Court's first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should
not expect it to clarify the entire field."78
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT TO THE STATES: McDonald v. Chicago 79
Not long after deciding Heller, the Court was tasked with deciding
whether the Second Amendment applied to the states via incorporation
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.80 In McDon-
ald v. Chicago, Justice Alito, writing for the Court, quickly summarized
the challenged laws as unconstitutional by stating that they were very
similar to those presented to the Court in Heller.81 The Supreme Court
relied heavily on the central holding in Heller,82 and the five-Justice ma-
jority held that the right of an individual to possess a firearm for self-
defense was "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty" and "deeply
75. Id.
76. Id. at 629.
77. Id. at 635.
78. Id.
79. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
80. Id. at 3026.
81. Id. Noting that "Chicago enacted its handgun ban to protect its residents 'from the
loss of property and injury or death from firearms."' Id. (internal citations omitted).
82. "[O]ur Central holding in Heller [is] that the Second Amendment protects a per-
sonal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within
the home." Id. at 3044.
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rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,"83 and therefore applied to
the States.84
However, like many recent controversial opinions by the Supreme
Court, the Justices could not agree on their reasoning. Justice Alito,
whose majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy held that the Second Amendment right is a
fundamental Constitutional right applied to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.85 Reading much like Heller,
Justice Alito exhaustively chronicled American history before, during and
subsequent to the drafting of the Constitution, citing to America's adop-
tion of England's belief that "the right to keep and bear arms was 'one of
the fundamental rights ....
Justice Thomas concurred in McDonald, but argued that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms was protected by a more straightforward
analysis, namely the Fourteenth Amendment's dictate that no state may
"abridge the privileges or immunities of the United States."87 He rea-
soned that the public believed the Privileges or Immunities Clause explic-
itly protected enumerated rights in the Constitution, which included the
Second Amendment's right to bear arms.88 As a result, he concluded, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause guarantees the right to keep and bear
arms, because this right was understood to be a privilege of American
citizenship. 89
III. THE BACKBONE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: WHAT
WE KNOW FROM HELLER AND MCDONALD
Heller struck down, as a violation of the Second Amendment, a federal
jurisdiction's ban on handgun possession and its ban on keeping operable
firearms in the home for self-defense. 90 Indeed, Heller recognized that
the Second Amendment "guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation," and that the "central component
of the right" is self-defense.91 Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Mc-
Donald held that the Second Amendment fully applied against to
States.92 Neither opinion addressed whether the Second Amendment
protects the right to carry a firearm outside the home, but it was explicitly
stated by the Court that in the Second Amendment context, "individual
83. Id. at 3036 (emphasis in original) (internal citations and question marks omitted).
84. Id. at 3026.
85. Id. at 3046 ("[I]f a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental from an American per-
spective, then . . . that guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits . . . their
ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values.").
86. Id. at 3036 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 594).
87. Id. at 3058-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 3077.
89. Id.
90. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
91. Id. at 592, 599 (emphasis in original).
92. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026.
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self-defense . .. [is] at the heart of the amendment's protection."93 The
Court did not decide Heller by resorting to tiers of scrutiny and balancing
tests, but rather decided the case by conducting an analysis of "both text
and history." 94 In holding that the central component of the right to bear
arms is for self-defense purposes, the Court "suggest[ed] that the right
has application outside the home, since the need for self-defense com-
monly arises there." 95
IV. ILLINOIS' HIGH COURT FOLLOWS THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT IN STRIKING DOWN CHICAGO'S SECOND
ATTEMPT TO LIMIT THE SECOND AMENDMENT
IN PEOPLE V. AGUILAR: THE RIGHT TO
CARRY OUTSIDE THE HOME
A. FACTS
A Chicago police officer witnessed a crowd of young men harassing
and vandalizing passing vehicles during an evening patrol.96 In particular,
the officer noticed that Aguilar was holding the right side of his waist
during the young men's activities. 97 The officer called for nearby col-
leagues to assist him in his surveillance and forthcoming pursuit of the
teenagers.98 After the young men walked into a backyard and noticed the
police pursuing them, Aguilar yelled an expletive and dropped the fire-
arm that he was holding in his hand.99 Significantly, the serial number on
the gun had been filed off and the gun held "three live rounds of
ammunition." 00
B. THE LAW IN QUESTION
Aguilar, who was 17 years old at the time he committed the charged
offense,101 was convicted under a Chicago firearm law that stated:
(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a
weapon when he or she knowingly: (1) Carries on or about his or her
person or in any vehicle or concealed on or about his or her person
except when on his or her land or in his or her abode or fixed place
of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm;
[and] . . . (3) One of the following factors is present: (A) the firearm
possessed was uncased, loaded and immediately accessible at the
time of the offense; (d) ... Aggravated unlawful use of a weapon is a
Class 4 felony ... 102
93. O'Shea, supra note 13, at 609.
94. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
95. O'Shea, supra note 13, at 610-11 (detailing robbery statistics that less than one in
eight armed robberies occurs in the victim's home).
96. People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 323 (2013).




101. Id. at 328.
102. Id. at 409 (quoting 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d) (West 2008)).
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C. THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT'S DISCUSSION AND HOLDING
The Illinois Supreme Court was faced with holdings by its state appel-
late court and a holding by the Seventh Circuit which diverged on the
constitutionality of the statute that Aguilar was found guilty of violat-
ing.103 Indeed, these holdings conflicted directly with one another, as
both courts differed in their interpretation of the same provisions of the
same statute at issue in the case.104 The Illinois Supreme Court chose to
follow the interpretation offered by its counterparts on the federal courts
over those of its fellow state justices.105 The court correctly stated that
"neither Heller nor McDonald expressly limits the [S]econd
[A]mendment's protections to the home," and both decisions strongly
suggest, if not outright confirm, that the Second Amendment extends be-
yond the home.106 Furthermore, since "individual self-defense" is "the
central component" of the Second Amendment, 07 then it would make
little to no sense to judicially interpret the Second Amendment to restrict
that right to one's home because "[c]onfrontations are not limited to the
home." 08 To that end, the Supreme Court in Heller stated that "the right
to have arms . . . was by the time of the founding understood to be an
individual right protecting against both public and private violence."1 09
Therefore, because the Chicago statute at issue categorically prohibited
an individual from possessing a firearm for self-defense outside the home,
it constituted a total statutory ban on a specifically enumerated constitu-
tional right."10 As a result, the statute at issue violated the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms."'
That being said, the Illinois Supreme Court refused an invitation to
further extend protection of the Second Amendment to minors and in-
stead decided that "the Second Amendment is not unlimited. . . . [T]he
right [is] not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose."11 2 In so stating, it looked
to multiple federal court opinions that previously stated that the posses-
sion of handguns by minors is conduct that falls outside the scope of the
Second Amendment's protection.113
103. Compare People v. Moore, 987 N.E.2d 442, 443 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); People v.
Montyce H., 959 N.E.2d 221, 222-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); People v. Mimes, 953 N.E.2d 55,
59-60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) with Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
104. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d at 327.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
108. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d. at 327 (citing Moore, 702 F.3d at 935-36).
109. Heller, 554 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added).
110. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d at 328.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 328-29 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).
113. See Nat'1 Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, Explo-
sives, 700 F.3d 185, 204 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir.
2009) (noting that the "right to keep arms in the founding period did not extend to
juveniles"); Powell v. Tompkins, No. 12-10744-WGY, 2013 WL 765339, at *16 (D. Mass.
Feb.28, 2013)).
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V. DRAKE V. FILK0 114-IT'S A JERSEY THING: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT MISFIRES WHEN FACED WITH AN INDIVIDUAL'S
RIGHT TO CARRY IN PUBLIC, AND NEW JERSEY'S
"JUSTIFIABLE NEED" REQUIREMENT
The challengers 15 in Drake v. Filko sought and applied for permits to
carry handguns in public for self-defense. 1 6 According to New Jersey's
Handgun Permit Law ("Handgun Permit Law"), New Jersey citizens that
desired a permit to carry a handgun in public were first required to apply
to the chief police officer in their municipality or to the superintendent of
the state police.117 In determining whether to grant or deny a permit ap-
plication, the Handgun Permit Law provides:
No application shall be approved by the chief police officer or the
superintendent unless the applicant demonstrates that he is not sub-
ject to any of the disabilities set forth in 2C:58-3c. [which included
numerous criminal history, age and mental health requirements],
that he is thoroughly familiar with the safe handling and use of hand-
guns, and that he has a justifiable need to carry a handgun. 118
Thus, for a law abiding citizen who is familiar with handguns and has
reached the age of majority, the real impediment to obtaining a permit to
carry a handgun in public is that he or she must show a "justifiable
need." 119 "Justifiable need" was defined as "the urgent necessity for self-
protection, as evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks which
demonstrate a special danger to the applicant's life that cannot be
avoided by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry a hand-
gun." 120 The challengers' applications were denied because the statuto-
rily-appointed government officials determined that the challengers failed
to exhibit "justifiable need." 121 As a result, the challengers sued for de-
claratory and injunctive relief, arguing that when a state requires a law-
abiding citizen to show a "justifiable need" in order to be granted a per-
mit to carry a handgun in public, it violates the Second Amendment, as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court began by detailing Heller and McDonald, correctly stating
that "the Second Amendment confers upon individuals a right to keep
and bear arms for self-defense ... [and] the Second Amendment right ...
applie[s] equally to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." 122
114. 724 F.3d 426 (3d. Cir. 2013).
115. The challengers consisted of a group of sympathetic, responsible, and law-abiding
individuals that included a reserve sheriff's deputy, a civilian FBI employee, an owner of a
business that restocks ATM machines and carries large amounts of cash, and a victim of an
interstate kidnapping victim. Id. at 443.
116. Id. at 429.
117. Id. at 428.
118. Id. at 428 (citing N.J.S.A. § 2C:58-4(c)) (emphasis added).
119. See id.
120. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 429.
122. Id. at 430 (citing Heller and McDonald and noting that outside the home, lower
courts "encounter [a] 'vast terra incognita"').
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The Third Circuit then stated that there is a percolating issue as to
whether the right to bear arms extends outside the home.123 In fact, to
begin its discussion, the court recognized the same Seventh Circuit opin-
ion from 2012 that the Illinois Supreme Court found so persuasive when
it concluded that Second Amendment protection extended outside the
home.124 Nonetheless, the Drake court believed that the Moore court
read Heller too broadly1 25 because Heller only "struck down a single law
that 'ran roughshod' over D.C. residents' individual right to possess usa-
ble handguns in the home."126 This was the Third Circuit's first mistake in
its analysis, which is exhaustively detailed in Part VI. While the Drake
court refused to answer whether the right to bear arms for the purpose of
self-defense extends beyond the home, because it was "not necessary to
[its] conclusion," it assumed for its analysis of the "justifiable need" re-
quirement that the Second Amendment did guarantee such a right.127
While dicta, reading between the lines, the Court gave a strong indication
that, if faced with this issue, it would follow the Fourth Circuit in holding
that the core of the Second Amendment right does not extend beyond
the home.128 This would be in opposition to the Seventh Circuit.129
The court then followed other lower courts' analysis of Second Amend-
ment claims after Heller and McDonald.130 In the first step of the analy-
sis, the court turned its attention to the Heller Court's precept that
"certain longstanding regulations are 'exceptions' to the right to keep and
bear arms, such that the conduct they regulate is not within the scope of
the Second Amendment." 31 Seeing this "rule" as a guidepost, the court
found that New Jersey's "justifiable need" requirement qualified as
"longstanding," and therefore was a "presumptively lawful" regula-
tion.132 The court supported its conclusion by stating that the require-
123. Id. at 430 (citing Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d. Cir. 2012);
United States v. Masciondaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Marz-
zarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 2010)).
124. Id. (noting that while Heller did not expressly state a constitutional right to carry
arms in public for self-defense, it "implies such a right").
125. Id. at 431 (citing Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008))).
126. Id. at 430-31 (citing Moore v. Madigan, which stated that "[t]he Supreme Court
has decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as
important outside the home as inside)".
127. Id. at 431-32.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 430-31, 433. Contra Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
130. Id. at 429. First, the court asks whether the challenged law imposes a burden on
conduct protected by the Second Amendment. If it does not, the analysis is terminated. If
it does, the law is then evaluated under traditional means-end scrutiny. If it passes that test,
the law is constitutional; it if does not, it is unconstitutional. United States v. Marzzarella,
614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
131. Id. at 431-32 (referring to Heller's statement that the Second Amendment does
not disturb laws against preventing "firearms [possession] by felons and the mentally ill, or
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings and identified these regulatory measures as "presumptively lawful ones." Heller,
554 U.S. at 571, 571 n.26 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
132. Id. at 431-32.
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ment had existed in New Jersey for ninety years and that many states had
enacted similar regulatory schemes, including New Jersey's neighbor,
New York, who has had a similar regulatory system in place for over a
century.133 Of particular importance to the court was the fact that the
standards applied by the licensing officials in determining whether to
grant or deny an application for a handgun permit were "clear and spe-
cific," had been codified in the law, and had been explained in numerous
judicial opinions.134 This was the Court's second mistake in the opinion.
Significantly, though the court did not need to address the second step
of the analysis, it did so to determine the level of scrutiny that the law in
question would be subject to, i.e., rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or
strict scrutiny.135 This is not surprising, as the court continued its deep
desire to opine on matters not required for its decision.136
As a well-known fact, the Supreme Court failed to articulate the appro-
priate standard of review for Second Amendment challenges, though it
did state that rational basis scrutiny and Justice Breyer's interest-balanc-
ing approach were not appropriate. 137 In determining that intermediate
scrutiny applied, the court stated that intermediate scrutinyl 38 should ap-
ply because the law in question did not touch the "core" of the Second
Amendment, which is the right to possess usable handguns in the home
for self-defense.13 9 Couching the "core" of the Second Amendment as "in
the home" is the court's third mistake, because the need for self-defense
necessarily extends beyond the home.140
Significantly, other federal courts have followed suit in regards to an
application of this level of scrutiny by stating that heightened scrutiny is
only applicable when gun regulations substantially burden the Second
Amendment by inhibiting a law-abiding citizen's ability to possess a fire-
arm for self-defense.141 "By default then, if Second Amendment rights
are 'only minimally affect[ed],' the statute 'is not subject to any form of
heightened scrutiny.'"1 42
133. Id. at 431-35.
134. Id. at 434-35.
135. Id. at 435-36.
136. See BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "obiter dictum" as
"[a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary
to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential").
137. See Rostron, supra note 6, at 787.
138. Intermediate scrutiny for Second Amendment analysis does not require the gov-
ernment interest to be compelling, but it does require that the government's actual interest
be more than just legitimate. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97-98 (3d Cir.
2010). Under this standard, the government's actual interest must be significant, substan-
tial, or important, and requires a reasonable or substantial fit. Id.; Woolard v. Gallagher,
712 F.3d 865, 878-79 (4th Cir. 2013).
139. Drake, 724 F.3d at 430-31.
140. See O'Shea, supra note 13, at 610-11 (explaining that crimes such as armed robber-
ies overwhelmingly occur outside the home and necessarily implicate a citizen's right to
defend themselves against such criminal attacks).
141. See, e.g., Kampfer v. Cuomo, No. 6:13-cv-82 (GLS/ATB), 2014 WL 49961, at *5-6
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2014).
142. Id. at *6.
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Then, the court stated the obvious, that protecting its citizens is a "sig-
nificant, substantial and important" government interest,143 and ad-
dressed whether there is a "reasonable fit" between New Jersey's interest
in safety and the means chosen to accomplish this goal (i.e., the Handgun
Permit Law and its "justifiable need" requirement).14 4 By passing this
law, the legislative body of New Jersey believed that looking into the fu-
ture, issuing permits to only those who can show "a justifiable need"
would combat the dangers and risk to the public, as well as to the individ-
uals carrying firearms.145 However, there is no evidence that the New
Jersey legislature relied on any evidence to support this feel-good objec-
tive.146 Indeed, the court in this case was presented with a scintilla of
evidence "to show how or why its legislators arrived at this predictive
judgment." 147 Nevertheless, the court essentially said that New Jersey's
failure to present any evidence to support its prediction on the future was
"no big deal." 148 Allowing a state that has passed legislation that the
court itself "assumes," for the purpose of its analysis, to be constitutional,
to satisfy an intermediate standard of review (which requires a fairly close
tailoring between the means and ends) 149 through Miss Cleo-type 50
prognostications was the court's fourth mistake in its analysis.
Judge Hardiman dissented and stated that the "justifiable need" re-
quirement does in fact burden activity protected by the Second Amend-
ment, because the Second Amendment applies outside the home. 151
Hardiman then detailed the diversity of state gun laws, distinguishing be-
tween open-carry and concealed carry jurisdictions as well as shall-issue
and may-issue jurisdictions.152 Hardiman stated that in jurisdictions such
as New Jersey, local authorities statutorily have more discretion in decid-
ing who to grant permission to carry a handgun, and "the general desire
to defend one's self or property is insufficient" for a permit to be is-
sued.153 However, he noted that as a result of the Supreme Court's find-
ing in McDonald that the Second Amendment applied to the states,
"certain policy choices [of states are now] off the table."154 Hardiman
ultimately disagreed with the majority's reasoning and holding by con-
cluding that "New Jersey's justifiable need requirement unconstitution-
ally burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment as interpreted





148. See id. at 437-39.
149. The court stated that while there is "conflicting empirical evidence as to the rela-
tionship between public handgun carrying and public safety, this does not suggest . . . that
the 'fit' is not 'reasonable."' Id. at 439.
150. Miss Cleo Commercial-Call Me Now!, YouTUBE (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=pWyHiV313MA.
151. Drake, 724 F.3d at 443-44 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 441-42.
153. Id. at 442.
154. Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008)).
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in Heller and McDonald."55
VI. CORRECTING THE MISTAKES OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
AND APPROPRIATELY APPLYING THE SECOND
AMENDMENT TO ACTIVITIES
OUTSIDE THE HOME
With some help from Judge Hardiman, I will now address many of the
mistakes in the majority's reasoning, each in turn, which allowed the ma-
jority to conclude that the Second Amendment does not extend outside
the home, and to hold that "the requirement that applicants demonstrate
a 'justifiable need' to publicly carry a handgun for self-defense [is] a 'pre-
sumptively lawful,' 'longstanding' regulation and therefore does not bur-
den conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee."1 56
A. THE RIGHT TO CARRY IN PUBLIC NECESSARILY FOLLOWS FROM
HELLER AND MCDONALD
The first mistake made by the court was its reasoning in finding that
New Jersey's "justifiable need" requirement does not burden behavior
protected by the Second Amendment because that right has no applica-
tion beyond the home.157 A correct reading of Heller and McDonald
leads to the conclusion that the Second Amendment "is as important
outside the home as inside."158 Therefore, the court in Moore v. Madigan
did not read the Second Amendment too broadly, 159 but rather inter-
preted it correctly.
In Heller, the Supreme Court undertook an extensive historical analy-
sis to determine the meaning of the words used in the Second Amend-
ment, "specifically focusing" on "keep" and "bear" as being two separate
rights.160 In defining those terms, the Court stated that to "keep arms"
meant to "have weapons" and to "bear arms" meant to "wear, bear, or
carry upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of
being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of con-
flict with another person."161 Indeed, the Third Circuit's interpretation of
Heller that "bearing" arms means "keeping" arms within one's home is
strikingly odd given the definitions that the Supreme Court assigned to
these words in Heller.162 Indeed, "[t]o speak of 'bearing' arms within
one's home would at all times have been an awkward usage."163 Moreo-
ver, if the Second Amendment is limited to the home, a right to "keep"
arms (i.e. to simply "have weapons") would have been sufficient without
155. Id. at 458 (Hardiman, J. dissenting).
156. Id. at 440.
157. Id.
158. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir.2012).
159. Drake, 724 F.3d at 431.
160. Id. at 444 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582-84 (2008)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012).
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an explicit guarantee of the right to "bear" arms as well.164 Therefore, the
Second Amendment must extend outside the home, otherwise "bear"
would be read out of the Constitution and the Second Amendment-a
cumbersome interpretation.
To be sure, the most fundamental canons of construction forbid any
interpretation that would discard this language as meaningless or sur-
plus.16 5 Indeed, reading out "bear" from the Second Amendment would
not interpret the Second Amendment "as a whole," and would
"render[ ] . . . sections . . . 'inconsistent, meaningless, or superfluous.'"1 6 6
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Heller stated that self-defense was
the central component of the Second Amendment.167 While the Court did
state that the need for self-defense of one's person, family, and property
was most acute in one's home,168 it would be an incorrect inference to
conclude that its statement means that there is not an acute need for self-
defense outside the home.169 Rather, the Court's statement most logically
implies that "some form of the right applies where that need is not most
acute."170 "Were it otherwise, there would be no need for the modifier
'most.' 171
Moreover, "[i]f the Second Amendment right were confined to self-
defense in the home, the Court [in Heller] would not have needed to ex-
press a reservation for 'sensitive places' outside the home."1 7 2 Indeed, the
Supreme Court stated that the right to keep and bear arms was "'an indi-
vidual right protecting against both public and private violence,' such as
in case of armed resistance against oppression by the Crown." 173 Moreo-
ver, hunting and engaging in a militia are activities that occur outside the
home, and were activities protected by the Second Amendment at the
time of the founding.174 Therefore, the majority's conclusory analysis in
determining that the correct interpretation of the Second Amendment is
limited to the home is incorrect.
While I do not argue that the holding of Heller is explicitly broader
than its factual backdrop, the conclusion that the Second Amendment
extends outside the home necessarily follows from the Supreme Court's
opinion. Indeed, it is one thing to extrapolate rather than interpolate, but
164. Id.
165. See Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938).
166. Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
Fiorillo, 186 F.3d 1136, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
168. Id.
169. Moore, 702 F.3d at 935.
170. United States v. Masciondaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring).
171. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 444 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
172. Masciondaro, 638 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
173. Drake, 724 F.3d at 444 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594 (2008)).
174. Masciondaro, 638 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at
598-99).
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there is only one correct way to read the Court's explicit words.175 In this
case, it is similar to a one-way street, rather than a four-corner intersec-
tion. Since the Court in McDonald described Heller's holding as encom-
passing a general right to self-defense, first by establishing the legal
principle embodied in the Second Amendment and then by demonstrat-
ing and explaining how it was applied, the Court confirmed that the legal
principle it set forth in Heller was not confined to the facts of that case.176
B. PRESUMPTIVELY LAWFUL REGULATIONS WITH A NARROW LENSE
OF ABSTRACTION
The second mistake in the majority's analysis was its finding that the
"justifiable need" requirement did not violate the Second Amendment
because the New Jersey law was presumptively lawful as having been on
the books for approximately ninety years. 77 When the Supreme Court in
Heller listed presumptively lawful regulations it listed "laws forbidding
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and govern-
ment buildings," though this list was not exhaustive. 78 Notably, long-
standing state regulations were not included in this list. Even more
damning to the majority's reasoning, however, is the fact that "[i]f the
Second Amendment right were confined to self-defense in the home, the
Court would not have even needed to express a reservation for 'sensitive
places' outside of the home."179 Furthermore, previous federal courts
faced with Second Amendment challenges have "declined to find that
regulations not mentioned in Heller fall within its 'longstandingness' ex-
ception without a clear historical pedigree.1so
Additionally, in finding that New Jersey's "justifiable need" require-
ment was a longstanding exception, because some form of a "need" re-
quirement has existed in New Jersey since 1924, the majority ignored the
significant evolution that this New Jersey law had undergone since
1924.181 Indeed, the law has been amended many times, and until 1966, it
was legal in New Jersey to openly carry firearms without a permit; only
concealed carry of firearms has been banned since 1924.182 Hardiman de-
tailed why, among other reasons, this fact was significant:
This distinction is significant because courts have long distinguished
between these two types of carry, holding that although a State may
175. In Heller, "[the Court] held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep
and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, and we struck down a ... law that banned
the possession of handguns in the home." McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020,
3026 (2010).
176. Drake, 724 F.3d at 445 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
177. Drake, 724 F.3d at 431-35.
178. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
179. Masciondaro, 639 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., concurring).
180. Drake, 724 F.3d at 447 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (citing to Heller v. Dist. of Co-
lumbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Heller II); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d
673, 681 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 95 (3d Cir. 2010)).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 447-49.
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prohibit the open or concealed carry of firearms, it may not ban both
because a complete prohibition on public carry violates the Second
Amendment and analogous state constitutional provisions.183
Hardiman then detailed multiple state court opinions from Alabama,
Georgia, and Tennessee from the mid to late 1800's.184
Of significance was Nunn v. State, a Georgia Supreme Court opinion' 85
that the Supreme Court relied upon in determining the historical mean-
ing of the Second Amendment. 186 The Georgia high court in Nunn stated
that a statute that prohibited the carrying of concealed pistols was uncon-
stitutional because it also contained a prohibition on openly carrying con-
cealed arms.' 87 Notably, the Heller Court stated that the Nunn opinion
"perfectly captured the way in which the operative clause of the Second
Amendment furthers the purpose announced in the prefatory clause." 88
Therefore, the Third Circuit incorrectly relied upon historical precedent
in holding that New Jersey's "justifiable need" requirement was a "long-
standing" and "presumptively lawful" regulation and therefore did not
violate the Second Amendment. 189
Moreover, the majority arguably chose its level of abstraction too
broadly in determining the "longstandingness" of the New Jersey hand-
gun ban, reminiscent of Supreme Court justices disagreeing over the level
of generality or specificity in defining whether certain rights have been
traditionally protected under substantive due process.190 The dissent
points out that the majority is overly broad in its selection of laws to
exhibit the longstanding tradition of New Jersey regulation of guns, be-
cause it chooses laws that have regulated public carrying of firearms,
rather than examining "whether there is a longstanding tradition of laws
that condition the issuance of permits on a showing of a greater need for
self-defense than that which exists among the general public."191 Notably,
this type of generality in examining whether regulation is longstanding
has been criticized by judges from other courts as inappropriate as
well.192 "Demonstrating that there has been a longstanding tradition of
regulating the public carry of firearms tells us nothing about whether
183. Id. at 449.
184. Id.
185. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
186. Drake, 724 F.3d at 449 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
187. Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251.
188. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 612 (2008).
189. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 440.
190. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003); Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C.
L. REv. 63 (2006).
191. Drake, 724 F.3d at 451 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
192. See Heller v. Dist. of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Heller II)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("But to rely on those laws ... is to conduct the Heller analysis
at an inappropriately high level of generality-akin to saying that because the government
traditionally could prohibit defamation, it can also prohibit speech criticizing government
officials.").
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New Jersey's justifiable need requirement ... is longstanding."1 9 3
C. IF THE GOVERNMENT REGULATION DOESN'T FIT,
You CAN'T SAY IT DOES
Finally, in applying intermediate scrutiny to New Jersey's handgun ban,
the majority chose the right standard, but did not in fact apply that stan-
dard, a reminder that a court can set out the proper standard but fail to
correctly apply the standard to the law in question. 194
In Drake, under the intermediate standard, New Jersey was required to
show that the law in question (i.e., the means) reasonably fit the State's
interest (i.e., the ends). 195 New Jersey's purpose in passing the "justifiable
need" requirement was to reduce the misuse and accidental use of
gunsl 96 and also limit the use of guns as much as possible. 197 This regula-
tion is far too broad and all encompassing to be categorized as narrowly
tailored in any sense of the word.
Surprisingly however, this is not the only court that has failed in apply-
ing intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment claims. 198 For instance,
"New Jersey presented no evidence as to how or why its interest in
preventing misuse or accidental use of handguns is furthered by limiting
possession to those who can show a greater need for self-defense than the
typical citizen." 199 In showing the danger this presents, the dissent offers
a great example to demonstrate "the absence of fit between the justifiable
need requirement and reducing misuse or accidental use of handguns." 200
Indeed, the majority acknowledges this very fact, but nevertheless es-
chews it in deciding the present case.201
The majority not only concedes its failure to apply intermediate scru-
tiny but may in fact be applying rational basis scrutiny to the law in ques-
tion. As a result, the majority runs dangerously close to violating the
Supreme Court's statement in Heller that Second Amendment claims are
not subject to mere rational basis scrutiny, because then "the Second
Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional
193. Drake, 724 F.3d at 452 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
194. For example, see generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)
(holding that the Fifth Circuit failed to apply strict scrutiny, though it purportedly applied
it to the Constitutional issue of the case).
195. Drake, 724 F.3d at 453 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
196. See id.
197. Siccardi v. State, 284 A.2d 533, 540 (N.J. 1971).
198. "[Some] lower courts have . .. applied an impotent form of intermediate scrutiny
that effectively gives lawmakers a blank check to override Second Amendment rights,"
because "public safety is always deemed an important interest," and courts give deference
to the legislature's view that a "challenged law will advance public safety." See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari for Plaintiff-Appellant, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n. v. McGraw, No. 12-10091 at 20
(Sept. 24, 2013) (referring to Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives, 714 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2013)).
199. Drake, 724 F.3d at 453 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 455.
201. Id. at 437.
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prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect." 202 While
"States have considerable latitude to regulate the exercise of the [Second
Amendment] in ways that will minimize that risk,. . . States may not seek
to reduce the danger by curtailing the right itself."203
Moreover, while courts must accord substantial deference to the pre-
dictive judgments of state legislatures, States are not thereby "insulated
from meaningful judicial review." 204 "Rather, [a court] must-'assure that,
in formulating its judgments, the legislature has drawn reasonable infer-
ences based on substantial evidence." 205 Therefore, the majority again
shows its misunderstanding of the intermediate standard "[b]y deferring
absolutely to the New Jersey legislature." 2 0 6
VII. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT ALSO MISSES THE MARK ON
MARYLAND'S "GOOD AND SUBSTANTIAL REASON"
REQUIREMENT
In Woolard v. Gallagher, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
holding that Maryland's good and substantial reason requirement was un-
constitutional. 207 Similar to the New Jersey regulation in Drake, the Ma-
ryland law required an individual to have a permit issued to them before
the individual could carry, wear, or transport a firearm. 208 An individual
could apply for a permit, which is issued by the state police, after a find-
ing that the applicant was an adult with no criminal record, drug depen-
dency, or violent tendencies. 209 However, in order to be granted a permit,
the applicant must have a "good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or
transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit is necessary as a
reasonable precaution against apprehended danger." 210 Furthermore,
under the Maryland law there are four ways an applicant can satisfy the
"good and substantial reason" requirement:
(1) for business activities, either at the business owner's request or
on behalf of an employee; (2) for regulated professions (security
guard, private detective, armored car driver, and special police of-
ficer); (3) for "assumed risk" professions (e.g., judge, police officer,
public defender, prosecutor, or correctional officer); and (4) for per-
sonal protection.211
Thus, there were ways to satisfy the requirement without an applicant
having to show "personal protection." However, the challengers did not
202. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
203. Drake, 724 F.3d at 456 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
204. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994)).
205. Id., 670 F.3d at 1259 (quoting Turner, 520 U.S. at 195).
206. Drake, 724 F.3d at 457 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
207. Woolard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 2013).
208. Id. at 868-69.
209. Id. at 869.
210. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 4-203(b)(6).
211. Woolard, 712 F.3d at 869-70.
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fall within these exceptions and therefore alleged that the "good and sub-
stantial reason" requirement for obtaining a handgun permit was viola-
tive of the Second Amendment.212
The court commenced its analysis by setting forth the mode of analysis
that federal courts have manufactured for Second Amendment claims in
the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court:213
[t]he first question is whether the challenged law imposes a burden
on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's
guarantee. This historical inquiry seeks to determine whether the
conduct at issue was understood to be within the scope of the right at
the time of ratification. If it was not, then the challenged law is valid.
If the challenged regulation burdens conduct that was within the
scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood, then we
move to the second step of applying an appropriate form of means-
end scrutiny.214
As many courts have similarly done, the Fourth Circuit assumed, for
the sake of argument, that the first requirement of the analysis was satis-
fied and moved immediately to answering whether the state's regulation
was sufficiently tailored to its purpose. 215 Notably, the "reasonable fit"
required by the court between the ends and the means was disproportion-
ately low after assuming that the regulation fell within the scope of the
Second Amendment's guarantee. The court stated: the test is satisfied if
Maryland's interests are "substantially served by enforcement of the"
good-and substantial reason requirement.216 In fact, the court stated that
Maryland had "clearly demonstrated that the good and substantial-rea-
son requirement advances the objectives of protecting public safety and
preventing crime because it reduces the number of handguns carried in
public." 217
The court showed tremendous deference, exhibiting rational basis scru-
tiny more so than intermediate scrutiny. As a result, the court incorrectly
refused to accept the challengers' argument that the Maryland law requir-
ing "good and substantial reason" functioned as a rationing system 218 de-
signed to limit the number of handguns in Maryland, because even
assuming that fewer guns results in less crime, a rationing system that
burdens the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right by making the
right more difficult to exercise cannot be considered reasonably adapted
to a government interest, for that system burdens the right too broadly.219
212. Id. at 870.
213. Id. at 874-75 (citing to 3rd Circuit, 4th Circuit, 5th Circuit, 6th Circuit, 7th Circuit,
10th Circuit, and D.C. Circuit opinions from 2010-2012).
214. Id. at 875 (quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010)) (altera-
tion in original).
215. Id. at 876-78.
216. Id. at 878 (quoting United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir. 2012)).
217. Id. at 879.
218. See id. at 881.
219. Id. at 877-78.
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The court rebutted this argument by stating that the right to be armed
for self-defense at home is subject to strict scrutiny, while the right to be
armed for self-defense outside one's home is subject to intermediate scru-
tiny. 220 However, imposing strict scrutiny as the standard for Second
Amendment cases in the context of one's home is wholly without sup-
port, as the Supreme Court itself has refused to set forth a standard.221
Rather, the Court explicitly stated that the law in Heller would fail under
any standard.222 Without a doubt, the drafters of the Second Amendment
understood that this extremely powerful right to "keep and bear arms"
may be used negligently, and that states would have relatively broad dis-
cretion in regulating the exercise of the right; that being said, a state can-
not reduce the danger by curtailing the right itself.2 2 3
The Woolard court then referred to a recent Second Circuit opinion
that addressed a similar statute, and found itself in agreement with its
reasoning because the statute in question there and the law in question in
Woolard both constituted "a more moderate approach" to protecting
public safety and preventing crime than a wholesale ban on the public
carrying of handguns.224 However, a rationing system, no matter how
"moderate" the approach is considered, violates the Second Amendment
if law-abiding citizens are prevented from lawfully carrying a weapon in a
public sphere where the need for self-defense measures is arguably at its
peak.225
VIII. CONCLUSION: SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTION
EXTENDS TO BEARING ARMS IN PUBLIC
Heller and McDonald do not explicitly decide whether the individual
right to bear arms, for self-defense purposes, extends beyond one's home
and into the public sphere. 226 Significantly, "[g]un violence is an intracta-
ble problem throughout the United States." 227 Indeed, gun violence is
front and center on many news reports, as it is occurring with more fre-
quency in sensitive places such as schools.228 Nevertheless, the documen-
tation of misuse or abuse of firearms is not new.2 2 9
220. Id. at 878.
221. During oral argument in Heller, Chief Justice Roberts even addressed the fact that
no standard was being set forth by the Court: "I don't know why when we are starting
afresh, we would try to articulate a whole standard that would apply in every case?" Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 44, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290).
222. Heller v. Dist. of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008).
223. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 456 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
224. Woolard, 712 F.3d 865 at 880-81 (citing Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701
F.3d 81, 98-99 (2d. Cir. 2012)).
225. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 444 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 430 (majority opinion).
227. Id. at 457 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
228. See Tucker, supra note 10; Spencer, supra note 10.
229. Drake, 724 F.3d at 456 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (noting that those that drafted
the Second Amendment were aware of the risk attendant to the right to bear arms under
the Second Amendment).
426 [Vol. 67
Bearing the Burden of Denial
Because the Supreme Court in Heller failed to specify the level of scru-
tiny required or offer much guidance to lower courts as to the application
of the Second Amendment outside the home,230 it has led to a deep split
in the lower courts on both levels231-a split in which some courts are
ignoring explicit Supreme Court language and failing to apply appropri-
ate scrutiny to laws that burden explicit constitutional rights.
A clear reading of the Second Amendment's text, along with the Su-
preme Court's guidance in Heller and McDonald, leads to an inescapable
conclusion: the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment extends
outside the home. This conclusion is supported by Heller's statement that
the core of the Amendment is "self-defense," 2 3 2 which is needed just as
much outside the home as inside the home.2 3 3 Furthermore, the right to
possess a firearm outside the home is supported by the text of the Second
Amendment, as interpreted in Heller, because it protects the right to
"bear"-a right which extends beyond the home. 2 3 4 Stated succinctly, the
core of the Second Amendment is the right to carry weapons for "self-
defense," and while the need for self-defense is "most acute" in the
home,235 the need for self-defense is undoubtedly acute outside the home
as well.
230. See generally Andrew Peace, Comment, A Snowball's Chance in Heller: Why De-
castro's Substantial Burden Standard is Unlikely to Survive, 54 B.C. L. REV. E. Supp. 175,
180-82 (2013); Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer's Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 704, 737 (2012).
231. See Rostron, supra note 230, at 725-62.
232. See United States v. Masciondara, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) (Neimeyer, J.,
concurring).
233. See Michael P. O'Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I):
Judicial Tradition and the Scope of "Bearing Arms" for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV.
585, 609-10 (explaining that crimes such as armed robberies overwhelmingly occur outside
the home and necessarily implicate a citizen's right to defense themselves against such
criminal attacks).
234. See Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584-92 (2008).
235. Id. at 628.
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